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ARTICLES
Taxing Privacy
Hayes Holderness*
ABSTRACT
In the United States, many low-income citizens are being held to a harsher
standard than wealthier citizens-these low-income citizens are being asked to
relinquish their privacy in order to obtain the public assistance they need,
whereas wealthier individuals are not subjected to similar levels of public
scrutiny for government benefits that they claim. Giving up privacy can have
devastating effects on individuals' lives-they may suffer various dignitary
harms, may experience repressed abilities to express themselves, and may even
be coerced into important life decisions by the government. This situation pre-
sents a unique problem to the neediest in our society: they can either give up their
privacy in order to receive benefits they are otherwise eligible for or they can
retain their private lives and suffer an economic burden in the amount of the
foregone benefits.
This choice may not seem outrageous to many in the United States, but it
presents a serious issue for our society. Under the current system of public
benefits administration, we ask a vulnerable segment of our citizenry to surrender
significantly more information about themselves to their communities and to the
government than we ask of any other segment, and it is not clear that valid
justifications for this system exist. Many have researched the effects of various
procedural requirements for receiving various forms of public assistance. This
Article follows that research and contrasts the economic effects of those
requirements on eligible individuals who forego their benefits with the privacy
harms created by those requirements for those who submit to them. Government
actors must consider this balance to ensure that the burden we put on those
receiving public assistance is fair and efficient. By considering that balance
differently-through the lens of taxation-this Article hopes to shed light on a
disturbing situation and to help frame the discussion for potential reform.
* Associate, McDermott Will & Emery LLP; J.D., N.Y.U. School of Law, 2011; LL.M., N.Y.U.
School of Law, 2012. For their support, insight, and guidance, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Ira
Rubenstein, Katherine Strandburg, Daniel Shaviro, Joshua Blank, Lawrence Zelenak, Helen Nissen-
baum, Vivek Chandrashakar, and the members of the NYU Privacy Research Group. Without these
people, and my tireless family and friends, this Article could not have been completed. The views in this
Article are solely those of the Author. @ 2013, Hayes Holderness.
1
The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
Individual concerns about privacy abound today and have throughout history.
Privacy itself may be hard to define, but most people would probably prefer not
to become victims of identity theft or to have incriminating photographs of
themselves displayed on the front page of the National Enquirer.
Privacy concerns can attach to almost every facet of a person's life, be they
rich or poor, young or old, famous or unknown. People desire privacy at home,
privacy in public, and privacy on the internet. People seek to keep themselves and
their information private with respect their friends, their co-workers, strangers,
and the government.
This Article is concerned with the way that the government interacts with in-
dividuals eligible for public benefits. The way the government chooses to dis-
tribute benefits can have significant ramifications for recipients' privacy. In
Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy, Pro-
fessor John Gilliom chronicles the experiences of mothers receiving public
benefits in Ohio.' The picture he paints is not a pleasant one. The women he
interviews live in fear of losing the benefits they rely on to survive. At the same
time, they express disgust and anxiety over the many invasive application
procedures and surveillance measures they must submit to. One interviewee
named Mary describes her experience:
You have to watch every step like you are in prison. All the time you are on
welfare, yeah, you are in prison. Someone is watching like a guard. Someone is
watching over you and you are hoping every day that you won't go up the
creek, so to speak, and [that you will] get out alive in any way, shape, or form.
You know, 'Did I remember to say that a child moved in?' 'Did I remember
to say that a child moved out?' And, 'Did I call within that five days?'
You know ... making sure all the time .... It's as close to a prison that I can
think of.2
When the government imposes highly privacy-invasive requirements on the
recipients of public benefits, it leaves needy individuals with a choice: submit to
the ensuing privacy harms, or lose the benefits they are qualified for. Losing such
benefits causes qualified individuals to suffer an economic burden, because had
they not valued their privacy, they would have received the government aid. For
those whose need is great enough, this choice between privacy and benefits may
exist in theory only, leading to implicit coercion by the government to give up
one's privacy by submitting to surveillance, public stigma, and government-
compelled lifestyle choices.
1. JOHN GILuOM, OvERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY
(2001).
2. Id. at 1.
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The idea that public benefits programs can cause serious privacy harms for
recipients is certainly not a new one.3 This Article seeks to contribute to the
literature by offering a substantial analysis of the privacy concerns created by
three redistributive programs in particular and then considering the potential
economic burdens created by the privacy-invasive requirements for these
programs. By considering these economic burdens through the lens of United
States tax policy, it is hoped that state actors may become more aware of the
consequences of their choice of distributive means, which will hopefully lead to
more thoughtful and efficient program design.
Part II offers a general overview of redistribution in the United States. It
examines the two prongs of redistribution: public benefits programs and taxation.
The two should not be considered different in economic substance, but only in
form.4 Both are simply tools the government can use to redistribute income.
Public benefits programs use government spending to increase individuals'
incomes; taxation can implement tax cuts to achieve the same increases in
incomes. Part II explores this concept in greater depth, and also develops the
principles of horizontal equity, vertical equity, and neutrality that drive the
redistribution system.
Part III takes a closer look at three particular methods of income redistribution
in the United States: the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program
(TANF), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The particular goals of each program within
3. At least two states, Florida and Michigan, have had laws requiring public benefits applicants to
submit to drug testing challenged in federal courts on privacy grounds. See Rebecca Catalanello,
Florida's Welfare Drug Testing Halted by Federal Judge, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.
miamiherald.com/2011/10/24/2470519/ florida-welfare-drug-testing-halted.html. The federal courts in
Michigan enjoined the state from conducting suspicionless drug testing of public benefits applicants or
recipients, holding that the practice was "an unconstitutional infringement of [individuals'] Fourth
Amendment rights." Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff'd,
60 Fed. App'x. 601 (6th Cir. 2003). Florida's law is subject to a temporary injunction issued by a federal
district court. Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
4. Consider David Bradford's illuminating "weapons supply tax credit," showing the equivalency
between spending and tax cuts:
Step I of the Bradford plan is to cut the weapons procurement request in the defense budget
to zero. Taken by itself, this would harm defense capacity. Step 2, designed to offset this
unfortunate effect, calls for enactment of a new "weapons supply tax credit" (WSTC). To
qualify for the WSTC, manufacturers will sign appropriate documents prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense (looking much like today's procurement contracts) and deliver to
appropriate depots weapons systems of prescribed characteristics. The WSTC, which may be
transferred to other taxpayers without limit, may only be used in payment of income tax. Step 2
is, apparently obviously, a tax cut.
David F. Bradford, Reforming Budgetary Language, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NEW
CENTURY 93-116 (Sijbren Cnossen & Hans-Werner Sinn eds., 2003). As demonstrated by the fictitious
WSTC, even items of spending that seem far separated from the tax system, such as defense spending,
could in theory be administered through the tax code.
5. SNAP was formerly known as the Food Stamps Program. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act
of 2008, Title IV, Subtitle A, Part I, § 4001(b) ("The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 ... is amended by
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the redistribution system are examined, and the implementation of each program
is described. The discussion focuses primarily on the potentially privacy-invasive
procedures that are used to implement each program and notes the significant
differences in administration of the EITC as compared with the other two pro-
grams. These differences may be a result of different views of taxation and spend-
ing generally, or may reflect that the EITC contains fewer non-redistributive
goals than SNAP and TANF. To illustrate, the EITC has a general goal of re-
distributing money to the working poor, whereas SNAP also has the goal of
raising the nutritional value of the food that low-income individuals obtain, and
TANF has the goal of encouraging marriage and traditional family structure.
Part IV considers the privacy concerns surrounding the different means of
redistribution after first giving a broad overview of privacy and privacy harms.
This Article uses a taxonomy created by Professor Daniel Solove to illuminate
the broad range of activities that can create privacy harms, focusing not so much
on recognized legal rights to privacy, but more on the harms to individuals that
privacy-invasive procedures can create. Four main types of privacy harms
created by public benefits administration are identified: (1) requiring recipients to
give up significant amounts of personal information; (2) subjecting recipients to
the stigma that attaches to the programs; (3) requiring recipients to subject
themselves to various forms of investigation and surveillance; and (4) interfering
with recipients' decisions and rights regarding their private affairs. This Part
concludes that programs such as TANF are highly privacy-invasive and may
inflict a number of these privacy harms on individuals applying to and currently
enrolled in the programs, while initiatives such as the EITC are not very
privacy-invasive and do not generate as many harms.
Part V then discusses the economic burden that privacy-invasive programs
create in terms of an implicit tax on privacy. After finding that the economic
burden is not normatively justifiable because it violates the principles of hori-
zontal equity, vertical equity, and neutrality, this Article explores two possible
justifications for the implicit tax: administrative concerns, and its potential as a
corrective measure. This Article finds arguments for administrative necessity
lacking given that the procedures put in place appear to be much more invasive
than needed to run the programs efficiently. Corrective taxes seek to make actors
internalize the social costs of their actions, and, while this Article does see some
potential validity to the corrective taxation theory, policymakers need to collect
data and make specific calculations to ensure that the economic burden is not
punitive. Given that the value of privacy to the individual is difficult to quantify,
neither justification can be fully accepted or rejected. Part VI concludes.
striking 'food stamp program' each place it appears and inserting 'supplemental nutrition assistance
program. ').
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II. REDISTRIBUTION AND TAx EQuTY
This Part describes generally the system of income redistribution in the United
States, as well as some of the principles that drive that system. Governments can
redistribute income through taxation and through public benefit programs. 6
Typically, a blend of the two methods will be used, but in theory, it is not hard to
imagine a system of redistribution that relies solely on taxation.7 In this scenario,
rates would presumably be highly progressive, placing larger burdens on the
richer than on the poorer members of society. The poorest members would most
likely encounter negative tax rates.8 This idea is not foreign: under the negative
income tax proposed by President Nixon, the lowest taxpayers would have
received payments from the government rather than pay taxes, i.e. they would
have been subject to negative tax rates. Under the plan, a taxpayer with a family
size of four with $1000 of income would have received $1000 from the
government, a result economically equivalent to receiving public benefits today.9
Alternatively, redistribution could occur solely through public benefits programs
if all members of a society were taxed the same amount, but benefits were only
given to selected individuals. In this scenario, though taxes would be in place,
they would not redistribute income in and of themselves because everyone would
be required to pay the same absolute amount.
Guiding systems of redistribution are the principles of horizontal equity,
vertical equity, and neutrality. Horizontal and vertical equity seek to ensure that
similarly situated individuals, by whatever measure used (the Internal Revenue
Code and this Article use income), share the same burden of society and that
those who are better-off bear more of the burden than those who are worse-off.o
The principle of neutrality compels the system of redistribution to affect
individuals' decisions to the lowest possible degree when compared to the
decisions the individuals would make if the system were not implemented.
6. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 9 (2005); see David A. Weisbach & Jacob
Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004) ("If the
underlying policy is held constant, there are no effects of putting a program into or taking a program out
of the tax system even if doing so hurts or enhances traditional notions of tax policy. Welfare is the same
regardless of whether the program is formally part of the tax system or is located somewhere else in the
government."); see also Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending-Does it Make a Difference?, 53 NAT'L TAX
J. 361, 361 (2000).
7. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191-93 (1962); CHRISTOPHER GREEN,
NEGATIVE TAXES AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM 160-76 (1967).
8. Both the Nixon and Carter administrations considered negative income taxes. See DANIEL P.
MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY
ASSISTANCE PLAN (1973); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ADMINISTRATION'S WELFARE REFORM PROPOSAL:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM FOR BETTER JOBS AND INCOME 5-11 (1978).
9. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 8, at 136-37.
10. As discussed below, infra note 13, vertical equity technically refers to the idea that those who are
not equal by the measure used do not share equal burdens. Vertical equity within the United States system
is implemented in a progressive manner, such that those with higher income pay a larger proportion of
their income in taxes.
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A. Horizontal Equity, Vertical Equity, and Neutrality
This section takes a closer look at the principles of horizontal equity, vertical
equity, and neutrality. To simplify the discussion, it is couched in terms of in-
come taxation only, though it should not be forgotten that taxation is typically just
one side of a system of redistribution. Whether an individual reaches his
post-redistribution level of income through taxes or public spending is economi-
cally irrelevant (though there may be significant practical implications)."
Understanding these principles is key to appreciating the United States' income
redistribution system.
1. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is the principle that individuals with the same amount of
income should bear the same amount of taxation. 2 Where income is the measure
of similarity, as under an income tax, other considerations, such as an individual's
occupation or consumption choices, should not affect how much tax an in-
dividual owes.
As might be expected, the notion of horizontal equity is relatively uncontrover-
sial. However, difficulties can arise in determining which taxpayers are the same.
For instance, is a young single mother with two children who has income of
$50,000 the same as an elderly lady with no dependents who also has income of
$50,000 a year? The measure of similarity must be clearly defined to attain
horizontal equity, a task that may be nearly impossible in the real world. As the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code demonstrates, defining income can
prove to be rather difficult.
2. Vertical Equity
Vertical equity technically is the principle that individuals with different
amounts of income should bear different amounts of tax, but is commonly cited
for the idea that those with more income should pay more in taxes than those
with less income.' 3 There are three standard measures of vertical equity:
(1) progressivity, (2) proportionality, and (3) regressivity.14
Under a progressive tax system, individuals pay a larger percentage of their
income in taxes as income grows. Under a proportional system, all individuals
11. Toder, supra note 6; see Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533, 534-35 (1995).
12. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 495 (defining horizontal equity as "the principle that individuals who are
similar but who make different economic or lifestyle choices should be treated in the same way by the tax
system").
13. Id. at 495 (defining vertical equity as "the principle that groups with more resources (higher
income, higher wealth, higher profits) should pay higher taxes than do lower-resource groups").
14. Id at 496.
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pay the same percentage of their income in taxes, therefore the absolute burden
will be larger on those with larger incomes. Finally, under a regressive system,
individuals pay a smaller percentage of their income in taxes as income grows.
3. Neutrality
The principle of neutrality holds that a tax should not change the economic
decision making of individuals by not discriminating between different types of
income, expenditures or other economic activities.15 Unless all possible eco-
nomic decisions are taxed at the same rate, any particular tax system will not be
neutral. Therefore, the practical goal of the principle of neutrality is to reduce the
effect of taxes on economic decision making as much as possible.' 6
In terms of an income tax, the neutrality principle demands that the tax be
as broad-based as possible, applying to all forms of income, in order to avoid
encouraging or discouraging individuals from deriving income in specific
ways. 17 For example, taxing income earned from investments less than in-
come earned from wages may encourage individuals to invest instead of earn
wages. Additionally, taxing economic income without taxing non-economic
income-such as the value an individual derives from leisure-may serve to
discourage individuals from deriving economic income at the margin where they
value their non-economic activities at least as much as their pre-tax economic
income.
B. Income Redistribution in the United States
This section takes a look at the system of income redistribution in place in the
United States. It is meant more as a general overview than a comprehensive
breakdown and will consider the two prongs of the system-taxation and public
benefits programs. While this Article is only concerned with public redistribu-
15. RICHARD D. POMP, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATiON 6-14 (1998); Boris I, Bittker, Comprehensive Tax
Base As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925, 929 (1967); William B. Barker, Optimal
International Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
161, 189 (2002); see William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV.
309, 366-67 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 15, at 367 ("Indeed, it is probably better to describe the personal
income tax by starting with the proposition that it is not neutral and cannot be made neutral in any
comprehensive sense. The question is not how to eliminate disneutrality or bias but how to arrange it
along the most tolerable lines."). One of the biggest perceived hurdles to a negative income tax is the
inability to design the tax in a way that would incentivize work while simultaneously providing a
guaranteed level of income, which in fact turns out to be one of the main issues policymakers are
concerned with when designing public benefits programs. The negative income tax encounters this
problem because the definition of income is not neutral. To have a truly neutral definition of income, the
value of such things as leisure and tasks done by one's self rather than purchased would have to be
included. Otherwise, such values are not taxed, and thus incentivized.
17. See generally, e.g., Bittker, supra note 15 (considering approaches to reform the federal personal
income tax by introducing a comprehensive tax base).
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tion, it should not be forgotten that private actors are also able to redistribute
income through actions such as charitable giving.
1. Taxation
The United States employs a number of different forms of taxation.18 This
Article addresses only the personal income tax, but it should be remembered that
all taxes raise revenue and revenue is generally fungible in the end, even if it is
earmarked for a specific purpose. Earmarked revenue, assuming it is spent on
something that would command funds otherwise, merely frees up other revenue
for other purposes.
The federal personal income tax is the largest revenue raiser for the United
States, and probably the most visible federal tax.' 9 The tax works by having the
individual taxpayer first calculate his gross income, defined as "all income from
whatever source derived." 2 0 The taxpayer then takes certain deductions from
gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income. 21 These deductions may be
allowed for normative or for practical reasons; for example, one of the most
significant deductions is for contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts,
encouraging individuals to save for retirement. 22 Finally, taxable income is
calculated by taking certain exemptions and deductions from the adjusted gross
income figure. Taxable income is the amount that determines the tax rate applied,
and is the amount against which that tax rate is then applied.23 Once the amount
of tax owed is determined, the taxpayer is allowed to apply any tax credits he is
entitled to against that amount of tax.24
The principles of horizontal equity, vertical equity, and neutrality drive the
structure and application of the federal income tax, though none of the principles
are fully realized in practice. The income tax ensures horizontal equity by
applying the same rate to all taxpayers with the same amount of taxable income,
but because of various deductions and exemptions, taxpayers with the same gross
income who engage in different behaviors may pay different amounts of tax.
Additionally, taxpayers with the same level of taxable income may owe different
amounts if one is entitled to a tax credit that the other is not. Thus, the income tax
is not purely horizontally equitable.
18. See generally I.R.C. Subtitle A (income taxes); I.R.C. Subtitle B (estate and gift taxes); I.R.C.
Subtitle C (employment taxes); I.R.C. Subtitles D, E (excise taxes); GRUBER, supra note 6, at 486-87
(describing the payroll tax, the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, property taxes, estate
taxes, and excise taxes).
19. See INrmAL REVENUE SERv., DATA BOOK, 2010, at 3 (2010) (individual income tax raises 50.1%
of total revenues); GRUBER, supra note 6, at 488-89.
20. I.R.C. § 61 (2013).
21. I.R.C. § 62 (2013).
22. I.R.C. § 219 (2013).
23. See I.R.C. § 1 (2013).
24. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of the individual income tax, see GRUBER, supra
note 6, at 489-92.
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The income tax is designed to be progressive. It achieves this, and secures a
level of vertical equity, by applying graduated rates to individuals as their income
25increases. Thus, as a taxpayer's income increases, the percentage of it that she
pays in taxes also increases. The tax is not purely progressive, however, in that
the rates apply to broad ranges of income. Therefore, a taxpayer with $500,000
of income is subject to a top marginal rate of 39.6%, as is a taxpayer with
$1,000,000 of income. For the tax to be purely progressive, the taxpayer with
$1,000,000 of income should be subject to a higher top tax rate than the taxpayer
with $500,000.
Finally, by beginning the taxpayer's calculation with all income from what-
ever source derived, the income tax attempts to introduce a level of neutrality to
the system. However, by chipping away at that initial definition of income to
determine taxable income, the system loses some of its neutrality. Taxpayers are
encouraged to engage in behaviors that generate exempt or deductible income
and are discouraged from engaging in behaviors that generate fully taxable
income. Further, because the tax only applies to economic income, behaviors that
generate non-economic or imputed income-such as leisure or doing chores
around the home-are encouraged.
Because of the way the amount of tax is ultimately determined, the federal
income tax works both as a revenue raiser and as a direct means of redistribution.
Various exemptions, deductions, and credits can be used to redistribute income to
lower-income individuals by lowering their effective tax rates. Additionally,
progressive taxation in and of itself is redistributive, since it requires higher-
income individuals to pay more of their income in tax, moving them closer to the
mean income level. If the higher taxes on the higher-income taxpayers were used
to fund the exemptions, deductions, credits, and lower rates applied to the
lower-income taxpayers, then the income tax could serve as a self-contained
and complete system of redistribution. However, as it currently operates, the
income tax is not only used as a vehicle for income redistribution, but also is used
to encourage certain types of behavior, such as investment in research and
development, home ownership, and charitable giving.2 6
2. Public Benefits Programs
The United States makes use of a number of public benefits programs to
redistribute income.2 7 These programs take tax revenue and distribute it to
qualified individuals as cash or in-kind benefits (i.e., non-cash benefits such as
25. See I.R.C. § 1 (2013).
26. I.R.C. § 41 (2013) (research credit); I.R.C. § 36 (2013) (first-time home buyer credit); I.R.C. § 170
(2013) (charitable giving deductions).
27. See generally MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Robert A. Moffitt ed.,
2003).
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services or vouchers only redeemable for certain things).2 8 These distributions
take place outside of the taxation system, and require their own administrative
structures. However, it is important to remember that benefits received through
these programs are economically indistinguishable from exemptions, deductions,
credits, or tax rate cuts implemented through the tax code. Assuming equal levels
of economic value, both tax relief and benefits will put a taxpayer in the same
final economic position.
Public benefits programs can be means-tested or categorical.2 9 Means-tested
programs use income and assets as the primary indicators of eligibility, but
may also look to other measures, such as household size, to determine the
appropriate level of benefits to which the applicant is entitled.3 0 These programs
seek to redistribute income to lower-income individuals, working with the
income tax to create a progressive system of redistribution. Categorical pro-
grams determine eligibility by certain demographic characteristics,3 1 as the goal
for these programs is not to redistribute income in a progressive sense, but
rather to distribute resources to encourage certain behaviors, such as joining
the military.32 Applicants for either type of program may be subjected to formal
and informal requirements for receiving benefits, such as burdensome ap-
plications and lengthy trips to administrative offices. Additionally, most United
States programs are both means-tested and categorical to some degree. This
Article is concerned with programs that are in significant part means-tested
because their purpose is, in at least some sense, to redistribute income. As the
next Part shows, however, even programs that are in significant part means-tested
may also have strong categorical eligibility criteria that define the scope of the
programs.
3. The Economic Equivalence of Taxation and Public Benefits Programs
Important to this Article is the concept that the effects on individuals of
taxation and spending through benefits programs are economically similar.34 One
is simply the inverse of the other, such that either could be used to achieve a
desired economic end. For example, suppose the government decides that Abe
should bear $5 of the social burden and Betty should bear $10. The government
could achieve this result by taxing Abe $5 and Betty $10. Alternatively, the
government could tax both $20 and then spend $15 on Abe and $10 on Betty.
Any mix of taxation and spending could be used to achieve the result desired.
28. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 459.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101-2414 (2008) (veterans' benefits).
33. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Modelfor Rationing
Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 837 (2004).
34. See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 972-73; Toder, supra note 6, at 363.
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Policymakers should use this insight to implement the most efficient means of
distributing the social burden.
Because of this equivalency, one cannot ignore the effects of spending pro-
grams on the horizontal equity, vertical equity, and neutrality of the redistribution
system. Spending programs may be able to better target relief, so that a desired
end result is efficiently met. However, it should also be noted that categorical
requirements for eligibility under these programs may further exacerbate con-
cerns surrounding all three principles. Taxpayers with similar income may be
entitled to different levels of benefits, violating pure horizontal equity. Addition-
ally, a taxpayer who is denied public benefits may end up paying the same
effective tax rate as someone with a higher income, violating the progressive
taxation principle under vertical equity. Finally, taxpayers may be encouraged to
engage in behaviors that they would not normally engage in so that they may
become eligible for benefits, violating the principle of neutrality.
III. TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES, THE SUPPLEMENTAL
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
Part III will explore three particular methods of income redistribution in the
United States: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). TANF and SNAP are means-tested public benefits programs;
TANF may distribute cash benefits or in-kind services to eligible individuals and
SNAP distributes benefits in-kind.3 The EITC is a refundable tax credit that
functions to lower the amount of tax an eligible taxpayer owes.37 This Part first
explores the goals behind each initiative and then examines how each initiative
achieves its goals, particularly focusing on eligibility requirements.
A. Goals of the Programs
These three initiatives all seek to redistribute income in a general sense, in line
with the progressive system of taxation adopted in the United States. However,
each initiative has its own nuances that will be explained in the discussion that
follows.
35. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 983 ("We view the integration question as one of how best to
organize the government rather than a question of tax policy."). Weisbach & Nussim continue in their
paper to consider the advantages and disadvantages of integrating certain types of programs into the tax
code. In particular they consider the design of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Food Stamps
Program. Id. at 997-1026. Eric Toder also considers potential efficiency differences between tax
expenditures and direct spending that can affect the cost of administering government programs. Toder,
supra note 6, at 368-71.
36. Robert A. Moffitt, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, in MEANS-TESTED
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 299 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003); Janet Currie, U.S. Food
and Nutrition Programs, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (Robert A.
Moffitt ed., 2003).
37. I.R.C. § 32(a) (2013).
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1. TANF
TANF, as its name implies, is intended as temporary poverty relief for needy
individuals. TANF was created through the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and replaced the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC)." PRWORA established
sweeping changes to the public benefits system in the United States, and the
replacement of AFDC with TANF was perhaps the most substantive.39 Political
opinion had shifted the goals of AFDC from providing support to single mother
families during the 1930s through the 1970s to encouraging support recipients to
seek work opportunities from the 1970s until AFDC's death in 1996.4
Against the backdrop of reform to AFDC, TANF's goals are easily under-
stood. TANF's goal is to distribute aid to needy individuals, while also providing
strong work incentives. 4 1 Through TANF, the federal government allows states to
design their own programs to distribute aid and encourage recipients to work.4 2
States are also allowed to encourage other behaviors that are deemed beneficial,
such as entering into traditional marriage and limiting family size.43 In general,
TANF's main non-redistributive goal is to encourage work, which in theory
relieves the burden of poverty on working individuals and, in turn, relieves the
burden on the state of supporting those individuals."
2. SNAP
SNAP is a new name for an old program, the Food Stamps Program (FSP),4 5
which began as a small program in 1961 and expanded nationwide by 1975.46
The goal of the FSP was very straightforward: to provide a nationwide safety net
of assistance by ensuring that all United States citizens were able to procure at
least some minimum level of food.
The name change to SNAP in 2008 did not alter this basic goal, but rather
was meant to signal the expansion of the assistance program to both create a
minimum safety net for food and also to promote nutrition. Along with
38. See Moffitt, supra note 36, at 291.
39. See Pamela Loprest, Stefanie Schmidt, & Ann Dryden Witte, Welfare Reform under PRWORA:
Aid to Children with Working Families?, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOLUME 14 158-59 (James M.
Poterba ed., 2000).
40. See Moffitt, supra note 36, at 292-99.
41. See id. at 306.
42. See id. at 299-301.
43. See id. at 305, 307.
44. See id. at 306-07.
45. See Pub. L. 110-246, § 4001(b) (2008).
46. See Currie, supra note 36, at 205.
47. See id. at 199, 205.
48. This goal of promoting a minimum level of nutrition may be more of a goal in theory than in
practice, as it would be exceedingly difficult for the government to force recipients to buy "nutritious"
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implementing the name change, the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 also in-
creased the individual benefits under the program, with the hope that individuals
receiving assistance would be able to purchase more nutritious foods for home
consumption.4 9
As a federally mandated and designed program, SNAP also offsets state
variance in public benefits programs.o It achieves this goal by ensuring that the
states must give SNAP benefits to individuals who meet the federal eligibility
requirements, thus refusing the states the same autonomy received under TANF
to design their aid programs.
3. The EITC
The EITC was implemented in 1975 as a response to congressional and
presidential interest in a negative income tax, which would have served as a
universal antipoverty safety net.52 The designer, Senator Russell Long, and
proponents of the EITC feared that a negative income tax would discourage
lower-income individuals from working. The EITC thus provided assistance in
the form of a "work bonus," thereby incentivizing work.54
In 1993, President Bill Clinton pushed for and signed into law significant
expansions of the EITC." The President's initiative increased the credit from
23% to 34% of earned income for taxpayers with one child and from 25% to 40%
foods for a number of reasons, one being the trouble with determining what foods would be deemed
"nutritious." See USDA Food and Nutrition Service, Implications of Restricting the Use of Food Stamp
Benefits (March 1, 2007), http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/menulPublished/snaplFILES/ProgramOperations/
FSPFoodRestrictions.pdf. Rather than require that nutritious foods be purchased, the statute allows for
funds to be used on nutrition education. See 7 U.S.C. § 2036a (2006).
49. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (Declaration of Policy(
It is declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the general welfare, to safeguard
the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among
low-income households. Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of
low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such
households. Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and
maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial
manner of the Nation's agricultural abundance and will strengthen the Nation's agricultural
economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of foods. To alleviate
such hunger and malnutrition, a supplemental nutrition assistance program is herein authorized
which will permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal
channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply
for participation).
50. See Currie, supra note 36, at 205.
51. See id.
52. See V. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in MEANS-TEsTED
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 144-45 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003).
53. See id. at 142.
54. See id. at 142, 144-45.
55. See id. at 146.
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for taxpayers with two or more children.5 ' The maximum credit was increased by
over $1500." The income limit on eligibility was increased by about $3700.58
President Clinton described the changes in his first State of the Union Address:
The new direction I propose will make this solemn, simple commitment: By
expanding the refundable earned income tax credit, we will make history; we
will reward the work of millions of working poor Americans by realizing the
principle that if you work forty hours a week and you've got a child in the
house, you will no longer be in poverty.59
President Clinton's expansion of the EITC turned it into the major antipoverty
measure that it is today. In 2001, Congress expanded the credit to reduce the
"marriage penalty" that occurs when taxpayers receive a lower credit after they
are married than when they were singlei6
In sum, the EITC has evolved from a modest "work bonus" into one of the
largest means-tested methods of redistribution.6 ' EITC spending now dwarfs
both TANF and SNAP spending. In 2010, the EITC was estimated to account for
$49,733,000,000 of federal government outlays, 62 while TANF and SNAP
combined were estimated to account for $20,045,000,000.63 As noted in
President Clinton's address, the goal of the EITC is to distribute aid to the
working poor; thus, it is both a redistributive program and a program designed to
encourage work.
B. Implementation of the Programs
Having explored the goals behind each of the three initiatives, the means
adopted for achieving those goals are now considered. This section will par-
ticularly focus on the eligibility requirements for each initiative.
1. TANF
TANF is funded by the federal government through block grants to the states,
but the states themselves are responsible for the design of their benefits programs,
56. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131(a), 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. President William J. Clinton, 1993 State of the Union Address (Feb. 17, 1993).
60. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001).
61. See Hotz & Scholz, supra note 52, at 146.
62. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BuDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECflVES-BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,
FY 2010, at 302, Table 19-1 n.7 (2010).
63. Id. at 107, Table 8-4 (TANF is estimated to account for $17,059,000,000 and SNAP is estimated at
$2,986,000,000).
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subject to some basic requirements that the federal government mandates.64
Those requirements include time limits on the receipt of funds (individuals may
not receive TANF funds for more than sixty months over their lifetime); re-
strictions on the eligibility of minors and aliens; and minimum work require-
ments (e.g., thirty hours per week for single mothers). These requirements
reflect the clear goal of the federal government to encourage recipients to enter
the workforce.66
States possess considerable freedom to design their TANF programs.67 They
may set benefit levels, income/asset requirements, family caps on assistance, and
the form of the benefits.68 Also, the entitlement nature of AFDC was not carried
over to TANF, so states are not required to serve all eligible individuals, allowing
the states to define eligibility beyond income, assets, and work requirements.69
As the discretion granted to the states is so broad, this Article will explore only
New York's program design.70 New York's approach is not meant to serve as an
example of the typical approach, but rather is intended to provide a set of discrete
eligibility requirements to consider. New York requires applicants to submit a
fifteen-page application to their local Department of Social Services.7 1 The
applicant is then interviewed by a Social Services worker and may be required to
prove the information contained in the application.7 2 Much of the information
must be certified by third-party individuals, such as doctors or landlords.
The information the application requires ranges from basic identifying
information to more in-depth household and personal information. 7 4 Applicants
must disclose how long they have been living at their current residence; other
individuals living at the same residence; and the employment, education level,
citizenship/immigration status, and race/ethnicity of all individuals at the
residence. Applicants are also asked to disclose a variety of personal issues they
may be facing, such as being pregnant, being a victim of domestic violence,
having a drug or alcohol problem, or having had their utilities shut off. 7 6 Child
64. See Moffitt, supra note 36, at 299.
65. See id. at 299-301.
66. See id. at 306.
67. See id. at 299.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. For a full description of the requirements and procedures of the New York TANF program,
"Family Assistance," see New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Temporary
Assistance Source Book, available at http://www.otda.state.ny.us/programs/temporary-assistanceTASB.
pdf [hereinafter Source Book].
71. The New York Application, Form LDSS-2921 S, available at http://www.otda.state.ny.us/programs/
applications/292 1.pdf [hereinafter New York Application].
72. See Source Book, supra note 70, at 3-4, 5-10 to -11.
73. Id. at 5-10 to -ll.
74. See New York Application, supra note 71, at 1-13.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1. The application asks, "Do any of these apply to you?" and the full list includes the
following: pregnant; victim of domestic violence; need to establish paternity; need child support;
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and medical support information must be reported, along with any information
regarding absent children or spouses and teen parentage." Medical information
about the applicant, and anyone living with and applying with the applicant, must
be reported, including the due date of anyone pregnant.78 Applicants must
provide their landlords' contact information and report the amount of housing
bills they pay.7 9 If the applicant lives in a domestic violence or a drug/alcohol
abuse shelter, that must be reported.80 If the applicant or anyone living with and
applying with the applicant has expenses such as alimony, child support, or
tuition, those must be reported.si Prior military service must be reported, as well
as prior felony convictions, violations of parole or probation, and prior denials of
public benefits.82
All of the information given is subject to verification by the caseworker, and
the applicant must consent to investigation by the Department of Social
Services.83 Such investigation may include unannounced visits to the recipient's
home.84 New York uses computer matching with databases of other agencies
such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to verify benefit amounts and prevent
fraud. All recipients of benefits must pose for a photographic "Common Benefit
Identification Card" issued by the state86 and must enroll in the "Automated
Finger Imaging System" of the state.
As is evident, the New York application for TANF-funded support requires a
drug/alcohol problem; fuel or utility shutoff- no place to stay/homeless; urgent personal or family
problem; fire or other disaster; have no job; serious medical problem; recently lost income; pending
eviction; no food; need foster care; need child care; and other. Id.
77. See id. at 5.
78. See id. at 10.
79. See id. at 11.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 12.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 14-16; Source Book, supra note 70, at 5-10 to -11.
84. New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Temporary Assistance Source Book,
supra note 70, at 5-4 (
The home visit by an investigator is one of the tools available for obtaining a total picture of an
applicant's situation. Normally, home visits are made after other tools, such as computer checks
and collateral contacts have been used. Aside from possible fraud, the investigator can observe
the need for services to develop parenting skills, or whether the residence has obvious health
and safety defects that should be reported to the appropriate staff).
An applicant may decline to comply with an unannounced visit and doing so cannot be the basis for
denial of benefits, but the investigator may schedule an appointment to investigate. Id. Failure to comply
with the application procedure is basis for denial of the application. Id.
85. Id. at 5-13.
86. Id. at 5-28.
87. Id. at 9-6. The Automated Finger Imaging System is "a computer managed system, operated by a
contractor designated by the department which captures the image of the two index fingers and the facial
photograph of the subject and provides a means of storing a record of those finger images in a manner so
that other records of finger images can be compared to those finger images." N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 18, § 384.1.
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significant amount of information and imposes burdensome and potentially
invasive certification and investigation requirements on applicants." The infor-
mation is requested to determine eligibility and benefit levels and to prevent
fraud.89 Refusing to comply is grounds for denial of benefits unless good cause
is shown for refusing, 90 and the New York courts can be unsympathetic to non-
compliant applicants.9 ' Additionally, this information is required to be recerti-
fied, usually every six months. 9 2 Recertification involves more in-office inter-
views and documentation.9 3 Failure to recertify can result in the denial of
benefits. 94 The federal government requires certain demographic information on
participants to be reported quarterly by the states, although the information can
be disaggregated from the individual and the states are allowed to use sampling
techniques to gather the information.95
2. SNAP
SNAP works as an in-kind benefits program: recipients receive credits on an
electronic debit card (EBT card) that can be redeemed at participating retailers
for eligible food.9 6 Cash assistance is not provided, as the program is meant to
ensure that SNAP recipients are only able to procure food with their benefits.
Though the federal government funds the program and sets the majority of the
eligibility requirements, the states are responsible for administering the program
and distributing the benefits.98 New York, for example, has individuals apply for
SNAP using the same application as for TANF-funded benefits.99 As a result of
federal control over eligibility requirements and the requirement that all eligible
88. The same application is used for SNAP and emergency assistance. As seen in the SNAP section,
the federal government mandates the eligibility requirements for that program.
89. See New York Application, supra note 71, at 14.
90. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 351.26 ("An applicant for or recipient of public assistance
is exempt from complying with any requirement concerning eligibility for public assistance if the
applicant or recipient establishes that good cause exists for failing to comply with the requirement.").
91. See, e.g., Tutuianu v. New York State, 802 N.Y.S.2d 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (upholding denial
of benefits for individual who refused state mandated psychiatric examinations that he claimed were
harassing); Medvedev v. Wing, 671 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (upholding denial of benefits
where applicant refused to submit to the automated finger imaging system due to religious convictions).
92. New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Temporary Assistance Source Book,
supra note 70, at ch. 6.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2013).
96. 7 U.S.C. § 2016 (2013). In general, "'[flood' means... any food or food product for home
consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and hot foods or hot food products ready for
immediate consumption ... [and] seeds and plants for use in gardens to produce food for the personal
consumption of the eligible household." Id. § 2012(k). Retailers are responsible for redeeming the
benefits only for eligible food and can be punished for violating the rules. Id. §§ 2019, 2021.
97. See 7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (2013).
98. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (2013); see Currie, supra note 36, at 206.
99. See New York Application, supra note 71.
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individuals who apply must receive the benefits, the program serves to some
degree to offset state variance in public benefits by ensuring some minimal level
of benefits that each state must provide.'"o However, applicants are still subject to
the application procedures and requirements of the states.'o'
Eligibility and benefit levels are determined by income and household.10 2
Individuals who live, purchase food, and prepare meals together are counted as
one unit under the program.'O3 To meet the income restrictions, an applicant's net
monthly income must be less than the federal poverty line; gross monthly income
must be less than 130% of the federal poverty line."' Applicants must also pass
household asset tests, but the family home and one car are excluded from the
tests.'0 5 Beyond these federally set eligibility requirements, states have some
leeway to define the length of eligibility certification periods, the design of
outreach programs, and some "workfare" requirements for participation in the
program. 106
Applicants must go to a state office to apply and must recertify their eligibility
throughout the year, often on a monthly basis.107 Recertification often involves
returning to the administrative offices. Applications, as seen in the New York
example above, are often lengthy and burdensome, and they require supporting
documentation.'08
3. The EITC
The EITC is a refundable tax credit administered by the IRS.Ioo The amount of
the credit depends on the number of children the claimant has and how much
income the individual is earning. 1 o The largest credit is available for wage
earners with two or more children."' The credit itself is a proportion of earned
income up to a certain level, after which the dollar amount of the credit plateaus
before the credit is eventually reduced by a percentage of income above a certain
100. See Currie, supra note 36, at 205.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (2013); see id. at 206.
102. 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (2013); see Currie, supra note 36, at 206-08.
103. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) (2013); see Currie, supra note 36, at 206.
104. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (2013); see Currie, supra note 36, at 206-08.
105. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g) (2013); see Currie, supra note 36, at 208.
106. See Currie, supra note 36, at 206.
107. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1000-01.
108. The New York application is also used for SNAP and requires a significant amount of in-
formation from the applicant. New York Application, supra note 71. Weisbach & Nussim explore the
Indiana program in a footnote, finding that, "while only two pages long, [it] requires applicants to provide
extensive documentation," the collection of which is "a formidable task." Weisbach and Nussim, supra
note 6, at 1000 n.135.
109. See Hotz & Scholz, supra note 52, at 152-55; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1001-03.
110. I.R.C. § 32(b) (2013); see Hotz & Scholz, supra note 52, at 157-59.
111. I.R.C. § 32(b) (2013).
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level.1 2 Eventually, the EITC phases out when the claimant's income becomes
high enough.' 1 3 Unlike TANF, the EITC is not a temporary measure; as long as
the recipient remains within the specified income range, he can receive the
credit.114
The eligibility requirements for the EITC are relatively simple. The claimant
must have both earned income and adjusted gross income below a certain level,
which varies based on the number of qualifying children the claimant has. 1 1'
Qualifying children must pass age, relationship, and residence tests.' 16 Finally,
the claimant may not have passive income above a certain level." 7
To apply for the EITC, the claimant must file a regular tax return along with a
Schedule EIC.'18 The Schedule EIC collects information about any qualifying
children.'19 Because the EITC is refundable, it is available to individuals who
do not owe any federal income tax.12 0 Therefore, some claimants may have to file
tax returns that they would not otherwise file; however, data show that such
taxpayers represent a very small portion of those claiming the EITC.121
Now that the goals and implementations of TANF, SNAP, and the EITC have
been discussed, the next Part will consider the impact of these programs on
individuals' privacy and the resulting effects on the United States' redistribution
system. It is the theory of this Article that TANF and SNAP create significantly
inequitable taxes on privacy because of their invasive procedures and require-
ments, especially when compared with the EITC.
IV. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Given the information-intensive applications for some public benefits pro-
grams, the stigma that attaches to individuals enrolled in benefits programs, and
the governmental surveillance of recipients, significant privacy concerns arise in
the context of the United States redistribution system. This Article will again use
TANF, SNAP, and the EITC as examples to demonstrate how some redistribution
initiatives can generate privacy harms for their recipients.
112. I.R.C. § 32 (2013); see Hotz & Scholz, supra note 52, at 147-53; Weisbach & Nussim, supra
note 6, at 1001.
113. I.R.C. § 32(b) (2013); see Hotz & Scholz, supra note 52, at 147-53; Weisbach & Nussim, supra
note 6, at 1001.
114. I.R.C. § 32 (2013).
115. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1).
116. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3).
117. I.R.C. § 32(i).
118. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1001.
119. I.R.S., Form 1040, Schedule EIC.
120. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS, 1, 3 (2013).
121. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
52 UCLA L. REv. 1867, 1882 (2005); Janet Holtzblatt, Choosing Between Refundable Tax Credits and
Spending Programs, in 93 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX'N 116, 121 (2001).
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A. Privacy
Although the notion of privacy means many things to many people and can
be exceedingly difficult to define, 12 2 this Article will explore some common
conceptions. It should be noted that this Article is not necessarily concerned with
any legal right to privacy per se, although legal rights to privacy may make a
more compelling argument for the inequity of taxing privacy.12 3 Rather, the
concern is that individuals who value some form of privacy, whether they have
legal rights to that form or not, are being taxed because they value that form of
privacy. Daniel Solove identifies six general conceptions of privacy in his article
Conceptualizing Privacy: (1) the right to be let alone, (2) limited access to the
self, (3) secrecy, (4) control over personal information, (5) personhood, and
(6) intimacy. 12 4 In addition, Professor Solove offers a contextual conception of
privacy. These will be dealt with in turn.
The first notion of privacy, the right to be let alone, concerns the harms to the
individual resulting from new inventions and business methods that could make a
person's private and domestic life public.12 5 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
argued that the protection of privacy was just as important as the protection of
property. 2 6 This right of privacy protects the individual's personal life, and was
recognized by Justice Douglas as "[including] the privilege of an individual to
plan his own affairs, for 'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every
American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go
where he pleases."'l 2 7 The right did not apply to public matters or matters of
general interest, though.128 The right to privacy found recognition in the privacy
torts, which include intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts,
false light, and appropriation. 129
The conception of the right to privacy as limited access to the self involves the
122. "Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so
engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully
addressed at all." Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEo. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
123. It is worth noting that federal courts enjoined at least two states' laws requiring public benefits
applicants to submit to drug testing because the laws were seen as violating individuals' Fourth
Amendment rights. See Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Marchwinski v.
Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff'd, 60 Fed. App'x. 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
124. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1092 (2002).
125. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890)
("Modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected [an individual] to
mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."); see Solove, supra
note 124, at 1099-1102.
126. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 125, at 205-06.
127. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
128. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 125, at 214 ("The right to privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest.").
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652A-E (1977).
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individual's ability to shield himself from unwanted access by others.' 30 Privacy
encompasses the "right of every man to keep his affairs to himself, and to decide
for himself to what extent they shall be the subject of public observation."' 3 ' It is
"the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others--either
physical access, personal information, or attention."l 3 2 This ability is crucial to
"the promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, human relations, and furthering
the existence of a free society." 3 3
Privacy as secrecy embraces the notion that the individual may conceal certain
matters from others. 1 34 Judge Richard Posner describes it as the individual's
"right to conceal discreditable facts about himself." 3 5 The Supreme Court has
recognized that privacy encompasses the "individual interest in avoiding
disclosures of personal matters."13 6 Secrecy is especially important given the
legal "third-party doctrine," which holds that any information made known to
any third party can no longer be protected by the Fourth Amendment from
disclosure to government actors. " If an individual does not have the right to
keep his information private, then he is powerless, under the third-party doctrine,
to protect his information from the government.
The control over personal information idea, somewhat popular in the lit-
erature,13 8 holds that "[p]rivacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others." 3 9 The key to this concept is not simply how
much information others know about the individual, but what type of information
is known, and whether the individual has the ability to control that informa-
tion.140 The Supreme Court has noted that privacy is the individual's "control
130. See Solove, supra note 124, at 1102-05.
131. E.L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. Soc. Sci. 69, 80 (1880).
132. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENTAND REVELAION 10-11 (1983).
133. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
134. See Solove, supra note 124, at 1105-09.
135. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 46 (5th ed. 1998).
136. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
137. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REv. 561, 563 (2009).
138. See, e.g., ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1970); Randall P. Bezanson,
The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News and Social Change, 1810-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 1133
(1992); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
139. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also Solove, supra note 124, at 1109-15.
140. See Fried, supra note 138, at 483 ("Privacy, thus, is control over knowledge about oneself. But it
is not simply control over the quantity of information abroad; there are modulations in the quality of the
knowledge as well. We may not mind that a person knows a general fact about us, and yet feel our privacy
invaded if he knows the details.").
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over information concerning his or her person."l 4 ' It is argued that such control
allows for personal autonomy, private emotional release of the stress of society, a
safety valve to vent anger, and for limited and protected communications that are
needed for healthy social interactions and interpersonal relationships.14 2
The personhood model of privacy encompasses the protection of the individu-
al's personality, individuality, and dignity.14 3 This concept of privacy "com-
port[s] with important values concerning the fair and just treatment of individuals
within society."'" Individuals who lack privacy may feel stifled by the society
they are in and thus unable to grow and participate in that society appropri-
ately. 145 From another vantage point, privacy protects the "fundamental freedom
not to have one's life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing
state." 4 6 The Supreme Court has also weighed in:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Our
precedents "have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State. 147
Finally, the conception of privacy as intimacy refers to the individual's ability
to exercise control over access to her intimate relationships or aspects of life. 148
This allows individuals the ability to ensure that others do not judge them out of
context.14 9 It also ensures individuals can make decisions on personal matters
141. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
142. See WEsTIN, supra note 139, at 32-39.
143. See Solove, supra note 124, at 1116-20.
144. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1423 (2000).
145. Stanley L. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect of Persons, in NoMos XIII: PIVACY 2, 26
(J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971) ("[Rlespect for someone as a person, as a chooser,
implie[s] respect for him as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise, which could be disrupted,
distorted, or frustrated even by so limited an intrusion as watching.").
146. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 784 (1989).
147. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
148. See Solove, supra note 124, at 1121-24.
149. See Jeffery Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 8-9 (2000);
Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 Geo. L.J. 2063, 2065 (2001) ("Privacy's function ...
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without fearing that the world will find out.15 0
These six conceptions of privacy-the right to be let alone, limited access to
the self, secrecy, control over personal information, personhood, and intimacy-
are interdependent and much overlap occurs among them. However, they offer
a useful starting point for considering the relationship between privacy and
means-tested redistribution initiatives such as TANF, SNAP, and the EITC. In
addition to, and drawing from, the conceptions of privacy presented above,
Professor Solove advocates for a contextual conception of privacy that keys in on
particular problems and the value of privacy within the circumstances of those
particular problems.' In furthering his goal of identifying particular privacy
problems, Solove acknowledges four general groups of potentially harmful
practices: (1) information collecting, (2) information processing, (3) dissemina-
tion of information, and (4) invasions into people's private affairs.15 2 Many of the
harmful activities Solove describes are relevant to the discussion of means-tested
redistributive programs.
In the information-collecting group, surveillance-the watching, listening to,
or recording of one's activities' 1 3-and interrogation-various forms of ques-
tioning or probing for informationl54-are both relevant. Surveillance harms
individuals by causing uneasiness, self-censorship, and inhibition, creating a
form of social control that adversely affects freedom, creativity, and self-
development.' 5 5 Interrogation can make individuals uncomfortable regarding
how they appear to others, leading to compulsion, divulgence of private in-
formation, and forced betrayal by confidants.15 6
Three forms of information processing harms are relevant: aggregation-the
combination of various pieces of data about a person;157 identification-linking
information to particular individuals;1 58 and secondary use-the use of infor-
mation collected for one purpose for a different purpose without a person's
is not to protect the presumptively innocent from true but damaging information, but rather to protect the
actually innocent from damaging conclusions drawn from misunderstood information.").
150. See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992); see also Robert S. Gerstein,
Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY- AN ANTHOLOGY 265 (Ferdinand David
Schoeman ed., 1984); James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY. AN ANTHOLOGY 290 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 274 (1977) (considering a women's decision to have an abortion in the
context of the privacy as intimacy approach).
151. See Solove, supra note 124, at 1128-29, 1147. Solove contends that "[c]onceptualizing privacy is
about understanding and attempting to solve certain problems." Id. at 1129.
152. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 489-91 (2006).
153. Id. at 490.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 491-99; see also GILIOM, supra note 1, at 47-68 (describing the unpleasant experiences
of many individuals receiving TANF benefits in southeast Ohio while under the surveillance of the state).
156. See Solove, supra note 152, at 499-504.
157. Id. at 506.
158. Id. at 510.
No. 1]1 23
The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
consent.' 59 Aggregation causes dignitary harms by unsettling expectations of
what others know about an individual and by creating a profile of the individual
that is reductive and disconnected from the original context in which the
individual's information was gathered. 160 Identification harms the individual by
attaching informational baggage to him, inhibiting his ability to change, and
preventing self-development.' 6 ' Identification also increases the governent's
power over individuals and limits the ability of the individual to be anony-
mous.16 2 Secondary use creates fear and uncertainty over how one's information
will be used, leading to a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability.' 63 It also
creates dignitary harms because information is used in a way not consented to by
the individual.'"
Disclosure-the revelation of truthful information about a person that impacts
the way others judge that person's characterl65-iS a dissemination of informa-
tion harm.'6 6 It can cause reputational harm to the individual, thus inhibiting
people from associating with others, and can threaten the individual's ability to
develop by tying her to past actions.167 Additionally, due to the third-party
doctrine, disclosure of information permanently renders it no longer legally
private from the government.' 68
Finally, regarding invasion harms, intrusions-invasive acts that disturb one's
tranquility or solitudel 69-and decisional interference-the government's incur-
sion into people's decisions regarding their private affairs 70-are both impor-
tant. Intrusion violates an individual's ability to retreat from the presence of
others, making the individual uncomfortable and uneasy, and inhibits her ability
to form healthy relationships and artistic, political, and religious ideas.17 , The
home has long been the legal fortress of privacy, and intrusion into the home
is recognized as one of the most serious violations of privacy.17 2 Decisional
interference creates harm by chilling a person's decisions on subjects which we
believe should be free from the incursions of others, especially the government,
such as matters involving the home, family, and body.'7 3
159. Id. at 519.
160. See id. at 506-09.
161. See id. at 510-15.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 520.
164. See id. at 518-20.
165. Id. at 529.
166. Id. at 523.
167. See id. at 527-32.
168. See id. at 531-32.
169. Id. at 549.
170. Id. at 554.
171. See id. at 549-53.
172. See id. at 549; see also, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of
the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."' (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
173. See Solove, supra note 152, at 553-58.
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These harms have manifested themselves in many areas of the law, and legal
rights protecting privacy have been defined in tort law.17 4 Although harms
resulting from the violation of legal rights likely are more compelling than other
harms, what is important to take from this discussion is that there are numerous
interrelated conceptions of what privacy is, and these conceptions allow a
number of potentially harmful actions to be defined. The discussion of privacy
conceptions and harms in this section is by no means meant to be exhaustive. The
Article now considers how these potential privacy harms can manifest them-
selves in the realm of means-tested redistribution programs and the impact they
can have on potential recipients.
B. Privacy Harms and Redistribution
Having laid out the theories of privacy and privacy harms above, this Article
now considers how various methods of redistribution might create or avoid
these privacy harms. Again, the Article will focus on TANF, SNAP, and the EITC
as examples. The potential harms may be limitless, but as will be developed, the
biggest harms result from requiring recipients to give up significant amounts
of personal information, subjecting recipients to the stigma that attaches to the
programs, requiring recipients to subject themselves to various forms of in-
vestigation and surveillance, and interfering with recipients' decisions regarding
their private affairs.
1. TANF17 5
Of the three initiatives, TANF affords state actors the most opportunity to harm
the privacy interests of recipients. These opportunities arise because states are
allowed broad leeway to define eligibility standards and are not required to
distribute benefits to all eligible individuals.17 6 Essentially, because states are
allowed to say "take it or leave it," they have been able to easily intrude into the
private lives of TANF recipients.17 7
174. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirs § 652A-E (1977) (defining the "privacy torts" of intrusion
upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation).
175. For an in-depth study of the effects of the various invasive procedures and requirements of TANF
programs on individuals, see GiLuoM, supra note 1 (studying the experiences of a sample of mothers
receiving TANF benefits in southeast Ohio).
176. See Moffitt, supra note 36, at 299.
177. Federal courts have stepped in and enjoined at least two states' laws requiring public benefits
applicants to submit to drug testing because they were seen as violating individuals' Fourth Amendment
rights. See Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F.
Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff'd, 60 Fed. App'x. 601 (6th Cir. 2003). However, most
recipient protection from the courts comes in the form of restricting the states' ability to deny the
continuation of benefits, not the original acquisition of them, where there is a property interest in
the benefits created by statute. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) ("While
the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, ... it may not constitutionally authorize the
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To begin with, the application process typically involves numerous affronts
to the applicants' privacy interests. Applicants are asked to provide a wealth of
personal information and must undergo a "multi-stage, multi-day application
process" that is far from private.'"' The example of the New York program shows
that the information gathered is wide-ranging. Gathering this information, as well
as any confirming documents, can force applicants to expose their private
information to others outside of the TANF administration.' 79
This exposure outside of the public benefits administration, typically to
individuals that know and have a relationship with the recipient (explaining their
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.") (internal
quotations removed); cf Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975) ("[A] participating State may not
deny aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a clear indication that Congress meant the
coverage to be optional."). Courts require procedural safeguards in such situations. See Youakim v.
McDonald, 926 F. Supp. 719, 733-34 (N.D. Ill. 1995) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir.
1995)(
As Logan [supra] establishes, procedures or systems that govern the administration of public
aid programs must be fair and rational. States cannot create systems which arbitrarily deprive
persons of property. In Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit
wrote: "In the context of eligibility for welfare assistance, due process requires at least that the
assistance program be administered in such a way as to insure fairness and to avoid the risk of
arbitrary decision making.").
Humphrey v. Onondaga County Dept. of Soc. Services summarizes the considerations well:
It is well settled that a recipient has an "overarching property interest" in the continued receipt
of welfare benefits. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F Supp. 2d 331, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-66 (1970)); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 487 (1970); Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 631-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In general,
"the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty
or property." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). This principle applies with
"heightened scrutiny in the context of welfare benefits. Hart v. Westchester Co. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 160 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Welfare recipients rely on their benefits for
their survival, and thus are constitutionally guaranteed an evidentiary hearing before their
benefits are discontinued. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (requiring a pretermination hearing
because 'termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.'). Due process in this circumstance
required that plaintiff be given timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the
termination of benefits, and an effective opportunity to be heard at an evidentiary hearing. See
Hart, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 575; Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 148 (1985) (requiring 'timely and
adequate notice detailing the reasons' for proposed adverse administrative action). The hearing
"need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding" but must be held "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
2008 WL 1945231, at *5-7 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008).
178. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 25, 29
(2008). Indeed, in addition to-and partially as a result of-the potential privacy harms generated by this
application process, the process imposes informal qualification criteria on applicants by requiring them to
expend considerable amounts of time and effort to apply for benefits. See Super, supra note 33. These
informal requirements likely cause some potential applicants to avoid enrolling in the public benefits
programs they may need to survive. Id.
179. See Source Book, supra note 70, at 3-4, 5-10-5-11 (requiring verification by third-parties of
information on the New York Application); Gilman, supra note 178, at 29.
26 [Vol. XXI
Taxing Privacy
ability to confirm the information provided), ensures that recipients are unable to
keep private the fact that they are receiving benefits. Individuals receiving
benefits are stigmatized by the government and society, 80 and thus may wish to
keep that information private. The application procedures are not the only part of
the TANF process that identifies recipients to their communities; investigation
procedures also contribute to this exposure and generate other privacy harms of
their own.18 1
TANF recipients can be required to submit to many different investigation
procedures. Their application information may be shared with other agencies to
confirm data, 18 2 electronic surveillance may be used to track spending,18 3 DNA
testing may be required to prove paternity, 18 4 applicants may be fingerprinted and
photographed,18 5 and recipients may be subject to unannounced investigations of
their homes while they are receiving benefits. 18 6 All of these procedures can
create the privacy harms discussed above. Home visits and information sharing
increase the likelihood that the recipient is unable to keep his participation in the
program private. In addition, surveillance and interrogation can cause stress, fear,
and degradation.187 The aggregation of data and sharing of information between
government agencies raises fears of unapproved use of a significant amount of
personal data. This can generate stress and stifle the individual in making both
public and private decisions. DNA testing and fingerprinting can also be affronts
to bodily integrity. Finally, investigations of the home, especially unannounced
ones, can serve to disturb the recipient's tranquility and solitude. The harm here
may be seen as particularly severe given that the home has widely been
180. Gilman, supra note 178, at 28-29.
181. Id. at 29-30.
182. See id.; see, e.g., Source Book, supra note 70, at 5-6 to -9, 5-13 to -16 (allowing for information
sharing for law enforcement purposes and with other federal and state agencies). This information
sharing is considered by the government to fall within the "routine use" exception to the Privacy Act of
1974, found at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2010). Computer matching programs among agencies are used to
confirm data on public benefits recipients. See, e.g., GILLIoM, supra note 1, at 32-37 (detailing the effects
of computer matching programs in place in rural Ohio on public benefits recipients in the area). These
programs are subject to loose statutory provisions requiring that written agreements be in place between
the two agencies that are sharing data. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o). For a broader discussion on the right to
privacy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. ScHwARrZ, INFORMMION PRIVACY LAw 658-60, 684-85 (4th ed.
2011).
183. See Gilman, supra note 178, at 30.
184. See id.; cf Source Book, supra note 70, at 9-72, 9-73 (describing cooperation requirements for
establishing paternity that an applicant or recipient must take; even though such requirements do not
explicitly include DNA testing, they require the applicant or recipient to disclose a significant amount of
information about the parent).
185. See Gilman, supra note 178, at 30; e.g., Source Book, supra note 70, at 5-28 (requiring applicants
to be photographed for identification cards).
186. See Gilman, supra note 178, at 30; e.g., Source Book, supra note 70, at 5-4 (allowing for
unannounced home visits).
187. See Gilman, supra note 178, at 7; GILiOM, supra note 1, at 1-13, 115-136.
27No. 1]
The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
recognized as the bastion of privacy.' 88
Finally, TANF programs can serve as governmental means of decisional
interference; they can be used to affect the recipient's decisions regarding private
affairs.' 89 Not only can surveillance stifle the individual, causing him to act
differently than he would otherwise, but also some TANF programs affirmatively
push recipients into certain decisions, most commonly with respect to marriage
and family size. One of the goals of PRWORA was to encourage traditional
marriage structure, and TANF benefits are used to achieve this goal.1 90 Some
states require minimum standards of parenting performance for eligibility.' 9 '
Further, many states impose family caps, whereby after a certain number of
children the recipient's benefits will not increase and the recipient receives no
benefit increases for children she has while receiving benefits. 92 Finally, many
women recipients are given unsolicited family planning advice, such as
counseling and family planning classes, and are incentivized to put their children
up for adoption.'9 3 All of these things strongly encourage recipients not to have
additional children and may even cause some recipients to reduce their family
size. Though the Supreme Court arguably sanctioned such measures in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,194 the privacy concerns surrounding them are no less
significant, especially if recipients feel compelled to comply so that they can
receive benefits they need to survive.
Interestingly, language from Casey itself suggests that the government should
be careful not to interfere with individuals' decisional autonomy in areas
surrounding family life.' 95 Other Supreme Court cases likewise emphasize the
individual's autonomy in this area. 1 9 6 Professor Jed Rubenfeld views the right to
188. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."') (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
189. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 178, at 4.
190. See Moffitt, supra note 36, at 307.
191. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-292 (2010); see also Super, supra note 33, at 859.
192. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-292H, K, L (2010); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11450.04H-L (2010); Moffitt, supra note 36, at 305; Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation
Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 174
(2002) (showing family caps in place in slightly less than half of the states as of 2000); see generally
Rebekah Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences,
29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 151 (2006).
193. See, e.g., N.Y Soc. SERv. LAw §§ 350, 409-i (McKinney 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.12.255(4)
(2013); see also Smith, supra note 192, at 177-84.
194. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
195. See id. at 851 ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the state.").
196. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (protecting the individual's right to choose intimate
sexual partners); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting the individual's right to choose to have an
abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (protecting the individual's right to choose whom to
marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the individual's right to choose to use
28 [Vol. XXI
No. 1] Taxing Privacy 29
privacy as a means for resisting government compulsion of individual actions.'97
Applicants who are in dire financial need might be compelled to submit to
TANF's invasive procedures, thus exposing them to potential state interference in
their lives by removing the protections offered by retaining their privacy.
2. SNAP' 9 8
SNAP programs may be less privacy-invasive than TANF programs. Eligibil-
ity requirements are federally mandated, and all who are eligible must receive
benefits-SNAP is an entitlement program. This restricts the states' ability to
intrude into the private lives of the recipients. However, this does not mean that
there are no privacy concerns surrounding SNAP.
As an initial matter, as seen in the New York experience, states may use the
same application for both TANF and SNAP benefits. This may lead some
applicants to provide more information than required to receive their SNAP
benefits.' 99 That information may be shared with other agencies for confirmation,
leading to secondary use and aggregation concerns similar to those in TANF.20
Additionally, applicants are still required to apply in person at the administrative
office, are interviewed by caseworkers, and may have to submit confirming
documents regarding work, income, and assets. 2 0 ' These procedures can lead to
third-party disclosure concerns regarding both the applicant's private information
and the recipient's inability to control who knows that she is receiving benefits.20 2
One unique feature of SNAP is that the benefits are provided in-kind, rather
than in cash.20 3 This ensures that the benefits are used solely to buy food (in
theory, but there is certainly a black market for SNAP) 2 " and, as such, may
reduce the amount of stigma placed on the program. On the other hand, the fact
contraceptive devices); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (protecting the individual's right
to choose to send her children to private school).
197. Rubenfeld, supra note 146, at 784 (defining privacy as "the fundamental freedom not to have
one's life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state"). Rubenfeld continues: "The
anti-totalitarian right to privacy ... prevents the state from imposing on individuals a defined authority."
Id. at 794.
198. See Currie, supra note 36, for a discussion of the requirements for applying to the Food Stamps
Program, the previous name of SNAP. Professors Weisbach and Nussim also offer a brief description of
the requirements for applying to the Food Stamps Program. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at
999-1001. SNAP is codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012).
199. However, courts have noted that different verification measures may be required for the different
programs when joint applications are used, perhaps alleviating this concern. See, e.g., S.L. v. Whitburn,
67 F.3d 1299, 1306 (7th Cir. 1995).
200. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Source Book, supra note 70, at 3-4, 5-10-5-11; New York Application, supra note 71.
202. See, e.g., Source Book, supra note 70, at 3-4, 5-10-5-11 (requiring verification by third-parties of
information on the New York Application).
203. 7 U.S.C. § 2016 (2013); see Currie, supra note 36, at 205.
204. E.g., Seth Freed Wessler, Selling Food Stamps for Kids' Shoes, CoLoRUNEs (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://colorlines.conarchives/2010/02/selling-food-stampsforkidsshoes 1.html (last visited Febru-
ary 10, 2013).
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that the benefits are provided in-kind rather than in cash may make it harder for a
recipient to conceal the fact that she is on the program. As soon as she makes a
purchase with SNAP benefits she is exposed to the immediate community, thus
allowing whatever stigma exists to attach. The use of the EBT cards may serve to
increase recipients' ability to conceal that they are on the program, as others
(except perhaps the cashier) would not likely realize that they are using SNAP
benefits rather than a debit or credit card to pay for their food.
Investigative and decisional interference harms are less of a concern with
SNAP than with TANF. Initial investigative procedures and recertification
procedures may stifle the individual and cause stress, 205 but home visits are not
made under SNAP. Purchases may be monitored through the use of the EBT
cards, which is invasive and may influence the recipient's purchasing deci-
sions.20 6 Additionally, some "workfare" requirements may be imposed on the
individual under SNAP, affecting her decision to work or not, but no provisions
similar to the marriage and family size provisions of TANF exist under SNAP. 20 7
3. The EITC
The EITC is far less privacy-invasive than either TANF or SNAP. 20 8 EITC
applicants are not required to go to any administrative office, to give up
significant amounts of private information, or to be subjected to caseworker
interviews or investigations (outside of the normal IRS auditing procedures). 20
Recipients are required to provide information that proves the qualifications of
the children they claim.2 10 Recipients may be concerned that the information
will be put to unapproved secondary uses, but the Internal Revenue Code does
provide for some protection of taxpayer data.2 11 Any information needed to
prove employment is already required on the individual's tax return. For those
recipients who have no tax liability and thus would not otherwise file tax returns,
there is a larger informational burden for applying in that they have to submit
their income and employment information to the IRS.
205. See, e.g., Source Book, supra note 70, at 5-1-6-22; New York Application, supra note 71.
206. See 7 U.S.C. § 2016(h) (2013); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4, 274.4 (2013).
207. See Currie, supra note 36, at 206.
208. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLtUM. L. REv. 790, 808-09
(2007). Compare I.R.S., Form 1040, Schedule EIC, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl040
sei.pdf, with New York Application, supra note 71.
209. However, EITC enforcement is overemphasized relative to other areas of income tax
enforcement at the audit stage by the IRS. Brown, supra note 208, at 808; Zelenak, supra note 121,
at 1884-87.
210. See I.R.S., Form 1040, Schedule EIC, supra note 208.
211. I.R.C. §§ 6103(a), (b)(2) (West 2013). However, there are broad exceptions for the use of the
information by other governmental agencies for non-tax purposes, such as for criminal investigations,
child support enforcement, and, of particular relevance to this Article, "Federal, State, and local agencies
administering certain programs under the Social Security Act, the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 or Title
38, United States Code, or certain housing assistance programs." Id. §§ 6103(i), (1)(7).
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Also, there is no significant stigma attached to receiving the EITC, and
recipients have a high level of control over the disclosure of the fact that they are
receiving the credit. There is no need to go into public to apply for the benefit, and
there is no general need to get third-party confirmation of the information
provided.21 2 Other than work requirements, the EITC, like SNAP, does not have
any non-economic requirements or provisions attached to it, minimizing any
decisional interference from the government.
Indicative of the concern for the privacy of individuals receiving the EITC,
widespread objections were made to IRS proposals for expanded precertification
requirements for receiving the EITC.2 13 The IRS proposed to require a limited
number of applicants to "provide more information on their relationship to and/or
residency status of the qualifying children listed on their [2002] return." 2 14 This
pilot program would be expanded in future years. Notable objections came from
the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, which asked the IRS to
"identify ... the categories of data and information that will be obtained through
the pilot precertification program and describe how such data and information
will assist the Service in curbing perceived high noncompliance,"2 15 as well as
from forty-five United States Senators, who claimed that the "pre-certification
program subjects only low-income working Americans to a harsher standard than
other taxpayers-simply because they are claiming a tax benefit designed to
assist the working poor."2 16 Even some individuals not opposed to the program in
theory recognized its potential to discourage EITC claims by eligible individu-
als.217 The IRS subsequently toned down the proposed program, and the deterrent
effect of the program on potential EITC claims is unclear.2 ' 8
The three programs discussed above demonstrate the various levels of privacy
harms often created by redistributive programs. At the most invasive and harmful
end of that scale is a program like TANF with burdensome application procedures
and information requirements, a high level of stigma attached to the program,
intrusive surveillance techniques, and provisions that can affect decision making
on personal affairs. Somewhere in the middle of the scale is a program like SNAP
with less burdensome information requirements, lower levels of stigma, and less
intrusive surveillance techniques and personal decision affecting provisions. At
212. Some self-employed individuals may be subject to closer scrutiny given fraud concerns, see
Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1886 n.79, which may cause them to seek third-party certification. In-
dividuals who use tax preparers presumably give up their information to the preparers in a voluntary way.
213. See Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1869-73.
214. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., IRS EXPLANATION OF EITC VERIFICATION INITIATIVE 5 (2003).
215. HERBERT N. BELLER, ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, ABA TAX SECTION SuBMrrs COMMENTS To IRS
ON EITC PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: COMMENTS ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PILOT PRECERTIFI-
CATION PROGRAM To DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY TEST FOR CLAIMING THE EARNED
INCOME CREDIT WITH RESPECT To QUALIFYING CHILDREN (2003).
216. MAx BAUCUS, BAUCUS, COLLEAGUES URGE END To "BURDENsOME" EITC PRECERlFICATION 21
(2003).
217. Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1870.
218. Id. at 1871-72.
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the least invasive and harmful end of the scale are programs like the EITC, which
do not have burdensome application procedures or information requirements,
have almost no stigma, and lack intrusive surveillance techniques and provisions
that affect personal decision making. Participation rates of eligible individuals in
the various programs may represent the privacy concerns surrounding them, as
TANF and SNAP have lower levels of participation among eligible individuals
than the EITC.2 19 The next section focuses on the effect of the privacy concerns
surrounding redistributive programs on the redistribution system.
V. THE IMPLICIT TAX ON PRIVACY
When the privacy harms associated with the redistributive programs cause
eligible individuals to avoid enrolling, they lead to an implicit tax on privacy.2 2 0
This is not a literal tax, but the economic burden created by the choice to forgo
benefits is similar to the burden created by a tax. Analyzing the burden as a tax, in
the context of United States tax policy, can be instructive. The privacy-loving
individual who is economically eligible for means-tested benefits is denied those
benefits when she refuses to submit to privacy-invasive aspects of a program.
This could result from refusing to give up information, refusing to ask for
information-confirming documents from others, or refusing to submit to home
investigations. The individual may value her information, may not wish to
subject herself to stigma, or may wish to avoid governmental interference with
her personal decisions. As a result, she will not receive benefits and her after-tax
economic position is worse than it would be if she did not so value her
information. The resulting economic burden she suffers is therefore similar to a
tax for valuing her privacy.
The implicit tax works similarly to a fee, because it is an all-or-nothing
approach. To the extent one values his privacy such that he avoids redistributive
programs, he suffers an economic burden in the full amount of the benefits
forgone; the actual value personally placed on privacy does not affect the amount
of the implicit tax.2 2' In other words, someone who is somewhat concerned about
his privacy such that he barely decides not to participate in SNAP suffers the
same burden as someone who cares so greatly about privacy such that she never
leaves her house (assuming the two are entitled to equal benefit levels).
There is an argument that the population subject to the implicit tax is not
219. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1004; Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1888-90. Of course,
privacy concerns likely are not the only factor driving nonparticipation. See ROBERT MOFFrff ET AL., A
STUDY OF TANF NON-ENTRANTS (2003), available at http://web.jhu.edubin/g/k/16_moffitt-finall.pdf
(detailing the reasons for non-entry into TANF programs).
220. Recall that a reduction in benefits-where the individual is eligible for the benefits-is
equivalent to a raise in taxes. See supra Part H.
221. For simplicity's sake, this analysis assumes that privacy concerns are the only factor causing the
individual not to enter public benefits programs, an unlikely real world scenario. See supra note 219.
Without this assumption, the actual tax on privacy could be seen as a portion of the benefit amount
forgone equal to the weight the privacy concerns carried in causing the individual to forego the benefits.
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limited only to recipients of public benefits, but includes all taxpayers who are
asked to give up more information to the government than the "base taxpayer"-
the taxpayer who is required to file a return and is asked to give up the least
amount of information. This broadened subgroup would include individuals who
itemize their deductions (such individuals are most likely wealthy). These
individuals must tell the IRS to whom they donated money, what medical
payments they made, and a variety of other information. To some degree, this
argument is accurate-such taxpayers are subject to the implicit tax on their
privacy should they decide not to comply with the itemization procedures.
However, with respect to the discussion below of administrative concerns,22 2 the
itemization procedures do not appear to go beyond the limits of administrative
necessity for preventing fraud. In comparison, the procedures of the various
public benefits programs do appear to go beyond those administrative limits, thus
creating the concern that lower-income individuals in particular are subjected to
undue privacy-invasive procedures that can result in the loss of benefits for the
privacy-loving individual.2 23
Taking a look at the three programs, the EITC has higher take-up rates by
eligible individuals than TANF and SNAP. 2 2 4 This disparity may stem from a
number of factors, but one may be that the less privacy-invasive procedures of the
EITC discourage fewer applicants than the more invasive procedures of TANF
and SNAP. It may not be possible to determine if privacy concerns are what
drive eligible individuals away from the programs, but given the number of
possible privacy harms one could suffer from the programs' various require-
ments, there should be unease that individuals are not receiving benefits because
they are concerned for their privacy. Indeed, the objections to the IRS's proposed
precertification program for the EITC indicate that these privacy concerns do
exist. 2 2 5 When privacy-invasive procedures reduce take-up levels, the implicit
tax on privacy is levied.
The implicit tax on privacy may have some merit, however. First, it may
turn out that the implicit tax is normatively proper because it fits the prescrip-
tions of horizontal equity, vertical equity, and neutrality. Second, there could be
administrative justifications for the implicit tax, even if it is not normatively
proper. Finally, there could be corrective justifications for the implicit tax.
222. See infra Part V-B.
223. Echoing this concern, Dorothy A. Brown notes that "[1]ow-income taxpayers are more likely to
be audited than any other taxpayer group." Brown, supra note 208, at 792.
224. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1004-05 ("[T]he EITC participation rate is about 89%,
while FSP participation is around 70%."); Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1888-90 (placing Food Stamps
take-up at 54% in 2001).
225. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text. Additionally, other support exists for the idea
that individuals do not seek benefits they are eligible for because of privacy concerns. See Movrrr ET AL.,
supra note 219 (detailing the reasons for non-entry into TANF programs); see also Gilman, supra note
178, at 4 ("[T]he privacy deprivations associated with applying for welfare discourage many needy
women from seeking assistance.").
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A. Horizontal Equity, Vertical Equity, and Neutrality
The implicit tax on privacy may violate the principles of horizontal equity,
vertical equity, and neutrality. This analysis relies on the measure of income
used by the Internal Revenue Code, but it should be noted that income can be
measured in many different ways, and the Internal Revenue Code's definition is
certainly no beacon of clarity. Alternative measures of income that would include
the value of retaining one's privacy would change the analysis that follows. The
Internal Revenue Code, however, does not consider that value in its calculation of
a taxpayer's income.
The implicit tax on privacy violates the principle of horizontal equity. Two
taxpayers can have the same income yet be taxed differently. Take Chris and Deb,
for example. Both individuals have income of $10,000 a year, neither have any
federal income tax liability, and both qualify for TANF benefits. Chris, however,
concerned for his privacy, does not want to submit to the privacy-invasive parts
of the TANF program and does not participate in the program. Deb, meanwhile,
does participate in TANF and receives $500 in benefits. At the end of the year,
Deb has $10,500, and Chris only has $10,000. Since under the redistributive
system, both Chris and Deb should end up with $10,500, all else being equal,
Chris has implicitly been taxed on his privacy by $500. Chris and Deb have the
same amount of income but are taxed differently. Looking at it from another
perspective, Deb is taxed at a negative rate, meaning she receives money, and
Chris is not taxed at all. Either way, the principle of horizontal equity has been
violated.
Similarly, the implicit tax on privacy violates the principle of vertical equity.
The violation occurs because taxpayers with different levels of income may be
taxed the same amount, or, in progressive systems of taxation, at the same rate.
To illuminate this violation, take Ed and Frank as examples. Ed has income of
$10,000 a year, and Frank has income of $50,000 a year. For simplicity's sake,
assume that Ed has no tax liability and Frank is subject to a 1% tax. Assume
that Ed is eligible for SNAP benefits of $500, but Frank is not eligible for SNAP
benefits. Ed, however, values his privacy and does not submit to the SNAP
procedures and thus does not receive his benefits. He has been implicitly taxed
$500, a rate of tax roughly equal to 4.76%. Frank is simply taxed on his income of
$50,000 at 1% and therefore he has also been taxed $500. Thus, here the implicit
tax on privacy not only violates vertical equity by taxing Ed and Frank the same
amount but also has resulted in a regressive tax rate structure, as Ed is subject to a
higher tax rate even though he has less income than Frank.
Finally, the implicit tax on privacy also violates the principle of neutrality.
Because the implicit tax affects only one kind of behavior, retaining privacy, it
discourages people from engaging in that behavior. That is, the implicit tax on
privacy discourages people from retaining their privacy. For the implicit tax to be
neutral, it would have to fall on all decisions regarding privacy, so that one type
of behavior would not be favored over the other. This could be achieved by
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imposing a fee on individuals who decide to submit to the privacy-invasive
procedures of the programs, although such a solution would certainly not
harmonize well with the goals of the programs.
B. Administrative Justifications
Given that the implicit tax on privacy is not normatively justifiable, perhaps
administrative concerns can justify the tax. That is, perhaps it is simply not
possible to deliver the redistributive benefits without imposing the implicit tax
on privacy. To some degree, this must be true. To redistribute income, the
government must have information identifying those in need. At the most basic
level, this includes identity and income information. In addition, information is
needed to coordinate the provision of other types of assistance associated with
public benefits programs, such as job training and child care assistance. Some
degree of publicity will occur when the benefits are given, even if it is simply a
check in the mail from the IRS. The question here is whether administrative
needs justify the invasions of privacy that go beyond these basic levels.
Perhaps the most basic administrative need for privacy-invasive procedures is
establishing the burden of proving eligibility. There are two parts to this need:
determining what party must prove eligibility and preventing fraud and abuse.
The first concern-relating to how eligibility is proven-is a story of administra-
tive economy. Who should bear the cost of proving eligibility? Is it more efficient
to have the individual prove his case to the government, or for the government to
prove its case against the individual? That is, should we presume applicants are
ineligible until proven eligible, or vice versa?
The answer to the burden question might not be as straightforward as it may
seem. Take TANF, for example. On the one hand, a presumption of eligibility
could bankrupt the system if too many ineligible people receive benefits. State
administrative resources are limited and might not be able to ensure accurate
results. On the other hand, a presumption of ineligibility may place a heavy
burden on eligible individuals to get their benefits. Some may become discour-
aged and social welfare as a whole may suffer if too many eligible individuals do
not receive their benefits. As noted by Professor Lawrence Zelenak, apparently
the American government finds it much more troubling should an individual get
benefits he is not entitled to, than should an individual not receive benefits he is
entitled to, and thus policymakers have established a strong presumption of
ineligibility, placing the burden of proof on the individual.2 26 However, this
system is costly; significant amounts of administrative resources and personal
resources of the applicants are used to ensure eligibility. Not only does it place
the initial cost of proving eligibility on the individual, but it also creates
additional verification costs the government must bear.
226. See Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1874.
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Having the government be responsible for proving that people are not eli-
gible would probably ask too much. It would essentially equate to a presumption
of eligibility, given the limited resources of the state. However, asking the
individual to prove eligibility in a system that is not subject to very extensive
verification procedures may be the most efficient result. The EITC offers a good
example of this approach. Applicants claim their eligibility with supporting
documentation. Extensive probing is not preformed on every applicant, but some
auditing does occur, allowing for a degree of checking. This approach hearkens
back to the approach of the "Declaration Era" of public benefits administra-
tion.227 During this time, applicants were not subjected to extensive interviews
and verification procedures, saving valuable administrative resources. Impor-
tantly, reported payouts to ineligible individuals did not increase relative to
periods with more extensive verification procedures, so the state did not end up
losing money by paying out to more ineligible people.22 8 Therefore, it seems
likely that the current verification procedures under programs like TANF could
be reduced to a more efficient level, and the individual, who presumably has the
least costly access to the information needed,22 9 would provide that information.
To focus too much on the eligibility criteria of any particular program misses
the point. The appropriate question to ask is: no matter what the eligibility
requirements are, is the individual required to prove his eligibility in a way that
unjustifiably impinges on his privacy? Perhaps other administrative concerns
explain the more invasive procedures seen in programs like TANF.
The second concern relating to the need to establish eligibility reflects the
desire to ensure that benefits are distributed accurately. One of the most common
administrative needs cited for the privacy-invasive procedures is fraud preven-
tion.230 Fraud prevention needs may be substantial, although the amount of
resources devoted to them varies among the programs. As one commentator
227. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFDC PROGRAM (1977) (describing the
declaration method as "provid[ing] for eligibility determination to be based, to the maximum extent
feasible, on the information furnished by the applicant without routine applicant interviews or
verification procedures"); GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 28-29.
228. See Administration of the AFDC Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relations and Human Res. of the H. Committee on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong. (1977). This is not to
say that there was no fraud, but fraud did not increase. Leon Ginsberg, commissioner of the West Virginia
Department of Welfare, stated, "[m]y statisticians tell me that there was no significant difference in error
rates under the simplified declaration system and the rather tedious interviews, home visits, and complex
eligibility determination we perform now." Id. at 367. Ultimately, the opponents of the declaration system
won out when the Nixon administration ushered in the more stringent procedures of the "Quality
Control" era. See GiLLIOM, supra note 1, at 29-32.
229. See Ward v. Thomas, 895 F. Supp. 406, 419 (D. Conn. 1995) ("The burden of proof on the
recipient in showing eligibility for welfare benefits is particularly appropriate where the knowledge is
solely with the recipient.") (internal quotations omitted). That the individual is the least cost provider of
information is by no means necessarily true. Consider that the government already has a wealth of
information on the individual, particularly income and work information, that the individual might not
have easy access to.
230. See Gilman, supra note 178, at 5.
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reports, "[a]lthough the total size of the EITC is about 70 percent greater than
that of the Food Stamp program, EITC criminal enforcement activities are a
,,231ot
small fraction of Food Stamp criminal enforcement activities. Many report
that the EITC, which does not have many privacy-invasive procedures, suffers
from a seemingly high level of fraudulent payouts, perhaps almost 32%.232 In
comparison, improper payments under TANF were estimated at around 28.5% of
payments in New York in the second half of 2005 and as high as 40% in Michigan
during the same period.2 33 Therefore, from the fraud prevention point of view,
TANF's highly privacy-invasive fraud prevention measures do not appear to be
working efficiently. Of course, these percentages do not tell the whole story.
Fraud prevention measures may be justifiable if the benefits of fraud prevention
outweigh the costs. 2 3 4 However, as the number of a program's eligibility criteria
increase, so will the cost of verifying that an applicant is eligible, and in relation
to the EITC's measures, TANF's measures do not seem cost effective. 2 3 5 This
imbalance may be caused by the differences between providing aid through tax
breaks instead of benefit programs, or it may be a result of TANF's non-
redistributive goals. But in a world of limited resources, administrative resources
used for fraud prevention in programs like TANF might be put to better use
elsewhere.2 36
231. Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1892. Granted, criminal enforcement is only one side of fraud
prevention, but it is telling that, even though all the programs have the effect of doling out government
money, "[EITC] fraud prosecutions are virtually nonexistent relative to prosecutions of Food Stamp and
TANF fraud." Id. at 1893. Weisbach and Nussim note that the EITC's administrative costs, calculated to
be one percent of its distributed benefits, are estimated at less than one-tenth the amount spent on the FSP.
They continue to note that "[n]otwithstanding the vastly higher administrative and compliance costs of
the FSP, it is not clear that it is any more accurate." Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1003-04.
232. See Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1890 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES
FOR EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNs 10 (2002)).
233. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF IMPROPER
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BASIC ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE FOR JULY 1
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2007); DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
REVIEw OF IMPROPER TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BASIC ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS IN
MICHIGAN FOR JULY 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2007).
234. See Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1875; cf Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 982 ("The
decision to put a program into the tax system can be seen as a decision that the accuracy costs ... are
outweighed by the simplicity benefits of integration for those particular programs.").
235. Other concerns around eligibility requirements exist. That some means-tested programs are used
as carrots rather than entitlements begs the question of what it means to be eligible. Is one eligible solely
because of her condition in life, or is she eligible only after she agrees to submit to the privacy-invasive
procedures? That is to say, does the single mother of two who has income under the poverty line become
eligible only once she has proven those facts? In the case of TANF, which is not an entitlement program
and used more as a carrot to get people to work, a convincing argument can be made that she is eligible
only after proving her situation. The argument is not as strong for entitlement programs. In this respect,
the goals of the programs may have a significant impact on the level of respect for privacy chosen.
236. See Zelenak, supra note 121, at 1900-06; cf Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 6, at 1026-27
(noting that certain initiatives are better implemented through the tax code and others though
administrative programs, perhaps because administrations are able to more directly target recipients that
are deserving of aid, i.e. have met not only income requirements, but other requirements as well).
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Another administrative concern is that of saving the state money, which may
be accomplished by discouraging eligible individuals from claiming their
benefits.23 7 While this is perhaps not the most righteous of purposes, it is
recognized that state actors have an interest in reducing the public benefits rolls,
and if people are discouraged from applying because of privacy-invasive
procedures, the state pays less in benefits. Engaging in such discouragement may
save a state money on the front end, but if individuals are not given benefits that
they need to survive, then the state may eventually have to spend more on them in
terms of medical care, emergency housing, or even covering the costs of death,
which should include the cost of the human life lost. Of course, if benefit levels
are set above the appropriate level, as might happen if the federal government
sets a national standard that is not adjusted for region, then discouraging
individuals from applying for certain benefits may prove to be less nefarious than
it initially sounds.
Finally, as mentioned above, the administrators of the various public benefits
programs clearly need some level of information regarding the recipients in order
to deliver the appropriate benefits to each recipient. Programs like TANF that
have many goals in addition to the redistribution of income will require more
information to effectively meet these goals, perhaps justifying more privacy-
invasive requirements. In such cases, administrators should still strive to ensure
that their programs do not impose unnecessary privacy-invasive requirements,
and administrators should not rely on the presence of non-economic goals to
justify unwarranted and potentially harmful requirements.
In the end, there may be administrative concerns that justify the imposition of
the implicit tax on privacy. The states must impose some administrative hurdles
to ensure that the programs run effectively, so perhaps the implicit tax is
inevitable. But to truly justify the administrative hurdles, the state should ensure
that they are at least generating net benefits. Determining whether net benefits are
generated involves comparing the cost of administrative hurdles with the savings
the state realizes from those hurdles, such as savings from preventing fraud or
discouraging applicants. One of the costs of these hurdles is the burden that
individual taxpayers experience from the tax on privacy. Implementing efficient
levels of administrative requirements will ensure that limited resources are not
wastefully spent.
C. Corrective Taxation
In addition to administrative concerns, it may be that the information gained
from the privacy-invasive procedures is overvalued by individuals from a social
welfare point of view. If such is the case, then the implicit tax on privacy can be
237. See generally Super, supra note 33. Professor Super's article offers extensive analysis of the use
of formal and informal eligibility rules for government benefit programs.
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seen as a corrective measure designed to encourage individuals to give up their
information. Corrective taxes serve to require actors to internalize the conse-
quences of their actions. For example, a business might find it beneficial to
pollute, but in so doing it harms society. The business could be fined-taxed-for
the pollution it creates in order to compensate the rest of society for the harm the
pollution created. Alternatively, a dog owner could fail to clean up after his dog,
and be fined for that inaction, covering the cost to society of cleaning up. 2 3 8
It could be that the invasive procedures the programs require applicants to
submit to are beneficial to society as a whole. This would occur when the gain to
society from subjecting the individual to the privacy-invasive procedures is
greater than the harm to the individual of submitting. In such a case, individuals
are not aware of the external effects of protecting their privacy, so society forces
them to realize the cost of those effects by imposing the implicit tax. The burden
imposed should be equal to the harm that society feels when the individual retains
his privacy. In the context of redistribution, society could benefit from the
information by using it to create more efficient and targeted public benefits
programs.
In the case of non-entitlement programs like TANF, which may intend to
encourage certain behavior by providing benefits, perhaps society has decided
that participants in such programs should have to give something to society in
return. Privacy could be that something; as a society, we demand that recipients
submit to the public gaze. That submission could be deemed to make up for the
externalities of receiving benefits, in that it allows society to ensure that it does
not suffer from those who do not change their behavior appropriately. Therefore,
those who do not enter the program are not taxed in a sense because the benefits
were never guaranteed to them. Only when one enters the program must she give
something in return. In such a scenario, one is ineligible for benefits until she
submits to the privacy-invasive measures.23 9
Again, it is hard to quantify the costs and benefits associated with requiring
individuals to engage in privacy-invasive procedures to receive redistributive
benefits. Until a monetary value can be placed on privacy, such will always be the
case. Even so, if the implicit tax on privacy is meant to be a corrective tax, it
should accurately reflect the cost to society that the individual generates when he
does not submit to the invasive procedures; otherwise, individuals are being
subjected to punitive fines for failing to submit.240 The individual's benefit levels
may reflect those costs, but then again they might not. They certainly should not
238. Granted in most places, this would typically be a punitive fine, but the example still holds weight.
Imagine that the fee is meant only to compensate society for the dog owner's inaction; the fee goes
straight to the city's sanitation department to fund the cleanup effort. Then the example is much more in
line with the implicit tax on privacy as described in this section.
239. See supra note 235.
240. When the fine exceeds the cost of the externality, it becomes a punitive measure, actually
inflicting harm on the individual for engaging in certain behavior.
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be used as the measure of the implicit tax without some sort of justification
from policymakers, and one would hope that legislative studies would be able to
establish whether benefits levels are an acceptable estimate of the social harm. If
so, then the argument for using the tax on privacy as a corrective measure is
particularly strong. Without that data, though, policymakers should be careful
justifying the tax as a corrective one.
D. Conclusion
This Part has explored the implicit tax on privacy created by some redistribu-
tive programs. This implicit tax is not normatively desirable because it violates
neutrality and horizontal and vertical equity, but might be defended on grounds of
administrative needs and as a corrective measure. It is important that state actors
understand the effects of a program's design and act in ways that benefit their
communities.
Without a good way to measure the value of an individual's privacy, the best
program design is unclear, but current administrative burdens appear to be too
costly in programs like TANF. Further, without knowing for sure what harm
will fall on an individual who does not submit to privacy-invasive procedures
and the societal value of that submission, it is impossible to conclude that a
corrective tax on privacy is justifiable. These ambiguities raise a difficult political
question, the answer to which depends on whether one believes that the
individuals applying for benefits or society as a whole should bear the brunt of
any miscalculated costs. If the corrective justification is relied on when placing
the burden on individuals, policymakers should establish an acceptable estimate
of the social cost of withheld privacy so that such individuals are not punished for
failing to submit to invasive procedures by forfeiting more benefits than those
costs.
The outlook for what to do is not particularly bleak, however. General
recommendations can be made. Programs with a goal of redistribution of income
should carefully consider the implementation of highly privacy-invasive proce-
dures. Programs designed during the Declaration Era of public benefits adminis-
tration provide examples of effective procedures.24 ' Requiring fewer confirming
documents and not requiring applicants to come to administrative offices to apply
and interview can make application procedures less public and can save
significant state administrative costs. States can rely less on invasive investiga-
tive procedures and disallow unannounced home visits. Redistributive programs
such as TANF, with goals to encourage certain behaviors, might require more
privacy-invasive measures to ensure eligibility than entitlement programs, but
program designers should be careful not to go too far and to ensure that the
measures they implement achieve their purposes. When state actors begin to
think of the economic burden that they may impose on potential recipients of
241. See supra note 227.
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public benefits concerned about their privacy, hopefully they will design more
efficient and privacy-sensitive benefits programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In today's digital age, privacy concerns are becoming more and more
prevalent. Spyware programs mine computers for personal data, websites track
people's online behavior, and cell phone apps collect geographical data through
GPS devices. But technology does not represent the only threat to privacy in
today's world, nor do private actors. Equally as threatening is the burden that
governmental actors impose on potential recipients of redistributive benefits
concerned for their privacy. Government actors certainly need information on the
individuals they serve, but some basic adjustments to redistributive programs
could help protect the privacy of those people. These adjustments should not be
quickly dismissed in the name of administrative convenience but rather carefully
considered given the effects they could have on the neediest in our society.
Without such consideration, programs can quickly become unnecessarily repres-
sive and invasive. This repression and the control that arises from it bleed through
these comments from Mary, the same public benefits recipient quoted in the
introduction:
It's not right. I have nothing to really hide, but it's just I don't think it is right
that they have to know everything about you instead of just your income
part .... I just don't think they should have to know everything. But like I said,
they have you over the barrel. If you don't turn everything in you don't get the
check. So it's that simple to a client. They know that if they don't do it they
don't get any income and whether it is right or wrong, you are just out. So you
do what the system says to do. You kind of follow along.242
Participants should only be asked to follow along with requirements that make
sense and are justifiable. Many of the current requirements may be neither.
Additionally, as new programs are developed, the privacy concerns of
potential recipients should play a major role in program design. Old programs
and the privacy issues they have created should serve as examples and guides for
new programs. As technology advances and information gathering, processing,
and disclosure become increasingly easy, privacy protections should be a primary
concern in any program design. Following the advice of the forty-five United
States Senators that objected to the IRS's proposed precertification program for
the EITC, we should ensure that benefits programs do not "subject[] ...
low-income working Americans to a harsher standard than other taxpayers-
simply because they are claiming a . .. benefit designed to assist the working
poor."243 Such a system of classism simply will not do.
242. GtLLIOM, supra note 1, at 50.
243. BAUCUS, supra note 216.
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